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Introduction
The birth of  the big rum companies constitutes one of  the most tangible 
tests to the strength of  Cuban business in the first and second industrial rev-
olutions. However, study of  the history of  Cuban rum has been clouded by 
litigation between the Cuban government and the largest global distillery, 
Bacardí, over the ownership of certain brands.1 The few works that have stud-
ied this factor have mainly done so from an ethnographical or anecdotal per-
spective, underestimating the importance of  the sector in the economic devel-
opment of  the country.
Cuban rum firms had everything going against them: the production of 
this liquor started later,; it faced the obstacles of  Spanish tariff  legislation un-
til 1898 and since then had enormous difficulty accessing its natural market, 
the US, which was in the hands of other producers.2 Nevertheless, Cuban rum 
firms (especially Bacardí) were among the largest in the world at the begin-
ning of  the twentieth century.3 The purpose of  this article is to explain how 
this became possible.
We could argue that vertical and horizontal integration contracts — in re-
sponse to changing circumstances experienced by the sector — contributed 
to overcoming these obstacles and thus led to the creation of large Cuban rum 
* I made this research under the support of  HAR2013-41121-P project.
1. Voss (2006); Foster (1990);  Gjelten (2006); Calvo (2000).
2. Huetz de Lemps (1997); Broom (1997); Columbe (2007); Morrison and Moreira 
(1988); Curtis (2007); Smith (2005); Plotkin (2001); Chez Cheo (1988).
3. See the figures in http://www.bacardilimited.com/corporate-responsibility/about-bacardi-
limited.
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producers. However, it is not enough to apply the Coase (1937), Williamson 
(1985) and Chandler (1962 and 1977) models when interpreting the success 
of  these firms. It is important to explain how the signing of  such contracts 
became feasible, how the parties contacted each other and what legal protec-
tion there was in such a hostile environment that was the Anglo-Saxon one 
on which the previously mentioned approaches were based. Cuba, like the 
rest of  Latin America, was a country that had fragile institutions after going 
through several wars, a traumatic independence process and several German 
occupations that led to permanent political instability. Thus, the skill and 
wisdom of  managers in decision-making and in the preparation of  contracts 
was not enough. It required the support that came from the citizenship, the 
confidence that came from their common origin, the existence of  social spac-
es where they could meet and negotiate contracts and the existence of  a hi-
erarchy with rules that were mutually respected. That is to say, social capital 
in the form of  trust, customs, rules and networks facilitated the creation of 
these firms.4 In this paper it will be shown that the social capital created by 
the Spanish emigrant minorities — through the generation of  financial re-
sources, an increase in their cultural capital and improvements in their insti-
tutions — allowed Cuban rum producers to overcome the obstacles referred 
to above.5
Social capital can be defined as resources provided and made accessible 
through membership of  a network.6 From this perspective the success of  the 
Cuban rum companies can be explained as a result of  the corporate entrepre-
neurship that network membership provided, following the interpretative 
model that Delgado, Delgado and Hurtano (2013) used for South American 
companies.
Although Tocqueville highlighted the relationship between civil society 
and entrepreneurial spirit that was to be found in the United States, the use 
of  that social capital in retrospective interpretations of  changes in companies 
is rare.7 The concept has been used more in explaining the quality of  western 
democracies and their economic growth rather than in the creation of  their 
business corporations.8 Economists, historians and sociologists have only re-
cently realized the usefulness of  considering non-monetary forms of  capital 
in the interpretation of  changes in the business sphere. Precisely, the study of 
the Cuban-American community under this perspective has more clearly re-
vealed the extent of  these “ethnic firms” and “ethnic niches”.9
4. MacElroy et al (2006).
5. Bourdieu (1980); Coleman (1988); Nahapiet and Grodhal (1998).
6. Nathapiet & Goshal (1998).
7. Putnam (1995).
8. Knack and  Keefer (1997).
9. Portes (1987).
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This paper, therefore, clarifies a relatively forgotten aspect in recorded his-
tory: the role of  foreign minorities in the industrialization of  Latin America. 
It also invites us to reflect on another equally neglected aspect: the develop-
ment of  great enterprises using indigenous capital in the region.
The contributions that this study makes go beyond explaining the factors 
involved in the establishment and subsequent success of  Cuban rum compa-
nies, as well as the reasons for the country’s specialization in manufacturing 
this product; the integration of  institutional and social analysis can help us 
better understand the historical perspective of  Latin American companies, 
which are often studied using models that are completely divorced from the 
reality of  this unique region.
The birth and growth of  large Cuban rum firms (primarily Bacardí and 
Havana Club) must be understood as a most meritorious example of  Latin 
American initiative and entrepreneurial spirit. We can thus argue that the 
study of  large rum companies can help clarify the nature and peculiarities, as 
well as the degree of  modernisation, of  non-sugar businesses in Cuba, un-
known to date in spite of  the fact that their economic achievements have al-
ready been widely disseminated.
It is for this reason that this article is particularly generous with the infor-
mation it offers. The business history of  Latin America is in need of  local 
players, since its existence and achievements have been blurred by unwarrant-
ed imperial contempt and cumbersome interpretations of  models that are 
both hostile and alien to the reality of  these countries.
The first steps of the cuban rum industry, 1832-1859
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, rum manufacturing was born 
in New England as the result of  the ageing of  sugar cane liquor in a whisky 
cask.10 Boston manufacturers were supplied with molasses from the British 
and French colonies in the Caribbean where they quickly established the first 
distilleries. However, the colonial privileges of  Spanish grape liqueurs held up 
manufacturing in Cuba and other Hispanic territories in which it was prohib-
ited after 171411.
With the end of  the Napoleonic Wars, businessmen from Havana and 
Santiago de Cuba, asphyxiated by the abusive tax privileges enjoyed by the 
Catalonian “moscatel”, fruitlessly implored Madrid to tolerate the produc- 
 
 
10. Temin (2003); McCusker (1989); Loades (2000).
11. Rodríguez (2003), p. 55; Bureo (2000), p. 114; William (2005).
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tion of  rum which was already being secretly made under the name “taifa” in 
basic and unsanitary stills owned by slaves.12
The Spanish government relaxed legislation but only somewhat, author-
ising Fernando Aristola to set up a modest factory in 1821.13 In Havana, five 
years later, José Batllo Buenaventura patented the first mechanical factory 
specifically dedicated to rum manufacturing.14 However, both initiatives end-
ed up badly. While the rum industry remained lethargic in Spanish colonies 
in the Caribbean due to metropolitan prohibitions, it experienced notable 
growth in French (Martinique, Guadalupe, Reunion), English (Guyana and 
Jamaica) and Danish (Saint Croix) colonies.
Finally, in 1832 the Spanish government, worried about the fall in molas-
ses exports to the United States, authorised J. J. Higgins to carry out a study 
into the profitability of  allowing rum production in Cuba. His report was 
conclusive: doing so would yield up to 12 million pesos annually in earnings 
for the Treasury, which, to date, was being enjoyed by the English in Jamai-
ca. Immediately, the Ministerio de Indias [Ministry for the Indies] allowed Be-
razana & Co. to set up three rum factories in Havana, Matanzas and Trini-
dad.15 However, in practice, the results of  this policy were very limited. In 
1839, Cuban rum exports only represented 1% of total value.16 The problem 
lay in the high taxes charged on its importation into Spain, the amount of 
which was non-negotiable for Catalonian manufacturers of  liquor who con-
trolled the metropolitan market.17
Cuban rum — which was very poor quality rum — was produced in Ja-
maican glass stills with a double return.18 In fact, in Cuba it was only drunk 
(out of  necessity) by inmates and not exactly to appease them.19  Bad and ex-
pensive, only at the end of  the 1850s did this liquor manage to make a small 
dent in the United States’ market, where it managed to reach a 3% market 
share in 1857, rising to 20.6% in 1859.20 However, it did so by camouflaging 
itself  as low-grade Jamaican rum, benefitting from the demand for its com-
petitor.
12. ANC, Gobierno Superior Civil,  1021/35999;  Campoamor (1988).
13. ANC, Gobierno Superior de Civil, 1475/58209.
14. OEPM, privilegio 505.
15. ANC, Reales Órdenes Comunicadas, 86/6.
16. The Merchants’s Magazine and Commercial Review, volume III, New York, 1840, 351.
17. ANC, Gobierno Superior Civil, 1179/46.096; AHN, Ultramar, 296/36.
18. ANC, Gobiernos Superior Civil,  1482/58854,  1490/ 59.609 and 566/28.065; OEPM, 
privilegio 595; Cantero (1866); Lorenzo (1860).
19. AHN, Ultramar, 1080/5.
20. Chamber of  Commerce of  the State of  New York (1862), p. 61.
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The Bacardí path, 1860-1881
This momentary vitality provided by the foreign market was merely an il-
lusion. Rum exports to the United States ceased in 1860 after an increase in im-
port duties. Criticism of Cuban businesses, greatly affected by the 1857 finan-
cial crisis, and legal and fiscal obstacles to Cuban rum manufacturing, worsened. 
Madrid had to concede. From 1860 onwards, the Government allowed the free 
establishment of distilleries and rum production without further impediments.
Facundo Bacardí Massó, a Catalonian businessman originally from Sitges 
(an area actually dedicated to “moscatel” production for sale in the Caribbe-
an), who had arrived in Santiago de Cuba in 1814, was the first to avail of this 
opportunity.21 In 1862, he decided to enter large-scale rum production, for 
which he used resources acquired through the running of a small foodstuffs 
business in Santiago and profit from coffee plantations in Baracoa that had 
been inherited by his wife Amalia Moreau.22 To this end, he created a compa-
ny in 1863 with 2000 pesos in capital, along with Leon Boutellier — a French 
liquor and sweet manufacturer — as a partner, and his brother José.23 Bacardí 
and the Frenchman set up a factory on the site of an old still erected by Brit-
on John Nunes in 1838.24 Barcardí had as his incentive, aside from the domes-
tic market which was practically virgin, the demand sailors had when visiting 
the seaport of Santiago where they drank “taifa”. By 1868, their liquor was 
sold on a large scale in Havana. It had even reached Spain (Graph 1).
Bacardí’s initiative soon had followers (Table 1). In Santiago de Cuba, the 
first rum-making enclave in the Caribbean was born due to the emigration of 
liquor-makers from Sitges, Bacardí’s birthplace. He stimulated the chain mi-
gration of  his fellow countrymen and relatives, thus forming a small and un-
usual industrial community in the Caribbean, united by kinship and common 
citizenship.
These small producers were able to succeed thanks to the advantages pro-
vided by social capital. From Bacardí, they learnt production and distribu-
tion techniques. Solidarity mechanisms solved their financial needs in their 
infancy and the institutions created by the newly-arrived Catalonian produc-
ers (welfare centres, hospitals, entertainment) offered them social spaces in 
which to sign contracts and a legal certainty that the colonial government did 
not provide. Such missions were carried out by the Trade Board, which by 
1880 had become the Chamber of  Commerce. In fact, both institutions 
— founded by Spanish traders in order to exercise influence as a lobby and 
21. AHN, Ultramar, 349/63.
22. AHPSC, Protocolos, 515/315.
23. AHPSC, Protocolos,  62/226-227.
24. Curtis (2007), p. 167.
16495_RHI_63_tripa.indb   17 13/6/16   12:36
Rum, business and society in Cuba, 1832-1965
18
solve internal problems outside the Cuban justice system — solved their dis-
putes, defended their interests and gave them legal advice.25 Indeed, the pro-
ducers found more support in these institutions than that provided by the gov-
ernmental administration, whose authority was very weak (apart from the 
military authority) due to the distance from Havana. The Catalonian origin 
of  most businessmen reinforced the commercial ties of  this small and power-
ful colony in a city where the black population was, in relative terms, much 
higher than on the rest of  the island.
Moreover, this social capital facilitated the spread of  technical change. 
Belgian, French and British copper and steam-powered, continuous distilling 
machines, such as those sold by Blumental, Sanguer & Coffeg, Shear & Son, 
Derosne, substituted the previous Jamaican stills in Santiago.26 Nonetheless, 
Egrot, who, since 1861, began marketing its distilling machinery in Spain, 
faced particular difficulty among Cuban producers.27 Factory control was 
now passed on to a master rum-maker (who was usually French), whose mis-
sion was to oversee the ageing and bottling processes, mixing rums from dif-
ferent years.28 Bacardí was the first to incorporate these innovative changes 
that were later adopted by its neighbours in Cuba.
Bacardí and its emulators, such as Crossi and Mestre, managed to create a 
genuinely Cuban liquor, the result of a distillation process  — similar to brandy 
— in whiskey or sherry barrels using the characteristics of indigenous sugar 
cane. This rum, known as “a la Española” [Spanish style], distinguished itself  
through its sweetness and a lower alcohol content than its Jamaican counter-
part (which was soaked in leather) and the rhum agricole of Martinique (which 
was practically brandy), which both had a sharper taste. Cuban producers 
agreed on the advantages of  this differentiation because they could explore 
new markets, especially among the urban upper classes.29  In the distribution 
of  his rum Bacardí used the distinctive drawing of  a bat, a symbol of  good 
luck in Spain.30
The export of  rum revitalized the declining port of  Santiago. It had been 
eclipsed by Havana and even Manzanillo since the abolition of the slave trade 
in 1817 (although this was still carried out illegally by one of  the protagonists 
of  this story). Its main traffic was sugar exports and flour imports that sup-
plied the city. Producers, especially Bacardí, built large buildings for the stor-
age of  cane and the aging of  liquor, connected by small railways to the main 
train tracks and the port.
25. Yáñez (1996); Friguls (1994).
26. Rodríguez (2003), p. 68; Duplais (1871); OEPM, privilegio 596.
27. Alambique (1871).
28. Cantero (1866).
29. Claves and Porter (1977).
30. Bonera (2000), p. 77.
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In short, the growth of  the rum making nucleus of  Santiago around Bac-
ardí was due to the high degree of  specialization of  the resources, following 
Williamson’s model (1983): site specificity (the daily encounter of  buyers and 
sellers in Santiago, a small-sized town), physical asset specificity (the built-in 
machinery that gave rise to the production of  a very distinctive rum), and hu-
man asset specificity (the training of  workers under French masters).
However, one might think that this argument overestimates the virtues of 
social capital due to the fact that sovereignty over Cuba made this group less 
compact and distinguishable. Actually, colonial rule did not provide much 
business for the Catalonian minority. In fact, it was harmful because of  the 
tariff  legislation which was mentioned earlier. The environment in which 
these entrepreneurs were working was not, of  course, very forgiving. Santia-
go de Cuba had nothing to do with Havana. It lacked financial press, a stock 
market, and a “Lonja de Comercio” (an institution where agricultural prod-
ucts were sold on a wholesale basis). Whilst, additionally, Havana enjoyed the 
advantages of  its proximity to the United States, Santiago was plagued by its 
proximity to Haiti, with the continuous arrival of  immigrants who worsened 
the problems of  marginalization and neglect suffered by the city. The Catalo-
nian minority in Santiago did not enjoy greater advantages than in other cit-
ies in emancipated Latin American countries, except that of  military protec-
tion. The capital, with institutions such as the Chamber of  Commerce and 
local government control, remedied this deficiency. Otherwise it could not be 
explained why the largest rum region in the world developed in the east of  the 
country, the poorest region in Cuba. 
However, it was precisely because of  this vitality that the industrial dis-
trict of  Santiago soon became saturated due to the continuous arrival of  new 
liquor manufacturers, which risked disturbing the harmony created by the 
city’s social capital. Some producers, having learnt the trade, left Santiago to 
settle in other parts of  the island. Such was the case of  Aldabó, who set up a 
factory in Havana along with his fellow Spanish citizen, Canals (Table 1).31 
To them we owe the spread of  the business to the capital city.
In fact, some of  the Sitges liquor-makers, as well as those from other 
towns in Catalonia, preferred to follow Bacardí’s example, not in Cuba, but 
in Puerto Rico.  In this Spanish colony they not only avoided Bacardi’s hier-
archy, but they exploited the by-products of  sugar cane, which had no indus-
trial usage until then. There the large central producer Ponce was set up by 
patriarch Sebastián Serrallés in 1865 when he began to distill “Don Quixote” 
rum, followed later by Roses, García & Co., among others. That was an ab-
solutely exceptional event in the economic history of  Latin America, since 
from one industrial district that was born thanks to its social capital (espe-
31. OCPI, l241/17.
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cially the common origin — Sitges — of its members) and its asset specifici-
ty, other districts surged in distant territories thanks to the same reasons, par-
ticularly the transmission of  knowledge and skills by those specific assets. 
Such migration was not due to hostile environments or the indolence of  man-
agers. Puerto Rico was also a Spanish colony so producers suffered the same 
disadvantages. It was the result of  the will of  the most daring to break Ba-
cardí’s rules and hierarchy to impose their own.
As a result, Cuba lost its monopoly on the production of  rum in the 
“Spanish style”.  The outbreak of  the Guerra de los Diez Años [The Ten Year 
War] (1868-1878) held up industrial growth (Graph 1). Initially, the conflict 
did not affect distilleries due to the increasing demand by the Spanish army 
but the creation in 1873 of  customs surcharges on rum exports (duties to pay 
TABLE 1 ▪ The first rum factories established on the island of Cuba (1862-1892)
Company Brand Town Year
Bacardí & Bouteiller Bacardí Santiago 1862
José Arechabala La Vizcaya Cárdenas 1870
E. Aldabo Aldabo Havana 1870
Robato & Beriguistain El Infierno Sagua la Grande 1870
Ignacio Romañá Romañá Santiago 1870
Andrés Brugal & Muntaner Brugal Palenque 1870
Camps Hermanos Matusalén Santiago 1872
Dusasacq & Co. La Campana Havana 1873
Cía Destiladora El Infierno El Infierno Sagua La Grande 1873
Compañía Licorera de Cárdenas Cardenas 1874
Fandiño Pérez, S.C. Fandiño Havana 1875
José Bueno & Co. Santiago 1876
Felipe Guzmán Santiago 1876
Rovira & Gallaume Santiago 1880
Manuel Planas Santiago 1880
Castillo & Co. Santiago 1880
Canals & Co. Canals Havana 1880
Cárdenas & Echevarría Havana 1884
Crossi & Mestre Santiago 1885
Nicolás Merino Merino Havana 1889
Isidoro Jaureguíar La Estrella Havana 1892
Source: OCPI,  59, 60, 63 and 141; HMM,  Comisión de Reformas Económicas, Cuadros estadísticos de las 
fábricas de cervezas y licores y su producción en 1926. 
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for war) by the Madrid government weakened the sector.32 On the other hand, 
the war favoured Puerto Rican producers who were exonerated from these 
same duties that threatened the Cubans.
Along with the lethal effects of  fiscal pressure, Bacardí suffered the dis-
mantling of  its management. In spite of  the lucrative return on investment 
received (6,500 pesos as a monthly dividend), the French partner withdrew 
from the company.33 Spanish authorities furthermore ordered the deportation 
of  the founder’s eldest son, Emilio Bacardí Moreau, to the The Chafarinas Is-
lands (islands off  the coast of Spanish-governed Morocco) due to his adher-
ence to a pro-independence cause.34 Deprived of his son’s and associates’ sup-
port, an already-aged Facundo Bacardí had to attend to the factory alone.
The situation improved in 1876 (Graph 1). Cuba, headed by Bacardí, pre-
sented the achievements of  its rum industry to the world at the Philadelphia 
Great Exhibition that year. However, in 1879 exports sank, once again, as a 
consequence of  the establishment of  a charge equivalent to one peso per bar-
rel of  rum sold overseas. Cuban producers had to bottle their rum secretly in 
32. Derechos (1877).
33. AHPSC, 556/ 292 and 315.
34. ANC, Donativos y Remisiones, Diario del Deportado Emilio Bacardí, 1879-1882, 24/49.
GRAPH 1 ▪ Spanish liquor trade with Cuba, 1863-1902 
(triennial mobile average in litres)
1864 1867 1870 1873 1876 1879 1882 1885 1888 1891 1894 1897 1900 1903
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Source: Estadística(s) del Comercio Exterior (1863-1902)
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Jamaica and export it as a local product in order to avoid this tax. This situ-
ation reached such a point that companies involved in production decided to 
export molasses instead, losing the added value.35 
The creation of new rum districts, 1882-1898
In 1882, the approval of the Ley de Relaciones, a trade law which eliminat-
ed the tariffs that taxed trade between Spain and its Caribbean colonies, un-
leashed the euphoria of Cuban distilleries. They were finally freed of that tax 
in the Spanish markets. The increase in exports to the “fatherland” gave rise 
to an authentic investment fever in the sector (Graph 1). Old stills that were 
spread across the island now evolved into modern rum factories (Table 2).
In Santiago, Bacardí maintained its dominance, in spite of  having to re-
build its factory after a fire in 1879. Following the death of  the founder in 
1886, brothers Emilio, Facundo and José Bacardí Moreau grouped together 
in a business association with 10,000 pesos in capital, taking charge of  the 
company.36 Management of  the firm fell on the shoulders of  Emilio Bacardí, 
35. Report (1879), p. 219; Porter (1980). 
36. AHPSC, Protocolos,  570/100.
TABLE  2 ▪ Rum factories in Cuba in 1888
City
Factories
1888 1902 1918
Havana 10 29 22
Matanzas 12 9 15
Cárdenas 5 5 8
Sagua la Grande 3 2  
Cienfuegos 3 1  
Camagüey 2   2
Holguín 1    
Manzanillo 5 3  
Guantánamo 1 5 1
Sancti Spiritus   1 1
Ciego de Ávila   1  
Las Tunas   1  
TOTAL 42 57 49
Source: Guía (1888, 1902, 1918).
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a local figure, great scholar and distinguished member of  the Partido Revolu-
cionario [The Revolutionary Party], while his brother José became the com-
pany’s representative in Havana.37 Emilio not only managed the firm but also 
the Santiago district rum group. Nothing happened in the sector without him 
being aware of  it and nobody could distil rum without his consent.38 Things 
had not changed much after the war. The Santiago nucleus regained its strength 
for the same reasons as its initial creation: social capital and ease in formal-
izing contracts.
The second rum-making enclave was set up by José Arechabala Aldama, 
born in Gordejuela (Vizcaya) 1847, who established his distillery in 1870 in 
the thriving port of  Cárdenas.39 Soon Eulogio Erizondo Urueta and Gerona 
and Doménech, among others, followed in his footsteps. Again, they repro-
duced an industrial district model structured around a common origin, as had 
been the case in Santiago, with the difference that these members were Basque 
businessmen, rather than Catalans. In Cárdenas, a very politically committed 
(albeit to the Partido Conservador [The Conservative Party]) José Arechaba-
la, assumed a leadership role. In these cities the organisation of  production 
was similar to the characteristics of  the Marshallian industrial districts but 
with the oddness that its strength was based on social capital.40 In fact, the 
solidity of  the districts was not only due to the hierarchy and community of 
interest but also to the existence of  spaces for socializing, inbreeding, kinship 
and solidarity, as well as the Spanish group of  producers acting as a lobby.
The company structure of  the rum industry in Havana (as well in Matan-
zas) was not one of  large factories but rather of  small establishments. In the 
capital, in the absence of  a large producer such as Bacardí, barriers to entry 
were far laxer. A handful of  pesos was enough to acquire a distillery and sup-
ply rum to restaurants and bars in the port. In this respect, the Havana sec-
tor showed more permeability than that of  Santiago. The entry of  new pro-
ducers to the sector was continuous, as was the collapse of  many. The most 
powerful producers (Trueba, Trespalacios, Aldabó, Gómez, Canals, Lopo, 
Merino) set up companies to distil rum together. Social capital contributed 
to the strengthening of  the sector but not by creating a hierarchized enclave 
such as in Santiago or Cárdenas, but through occasional horizontal integra-
tion. Havana producers did not generate more than site-specific assets and 
thus could not rival those from Santiago and Cárdenas.
However, once again tariff  legislation in the metropolis hindered the de-
velopment of  the sector and its territorial spread on the island. As a result of 
37. AHPSC, Protocolos, 569.
38. Bonera (2000), p. 91.
39. Bonera (2000), p.78; OCPI, legajo 59/1.
40. Marshall (1890).
16495_RHI_63_tripa.indb   23 13/6/16   12:36
Rum, business and society in Cuba, 1832-1965
24
1882 trade regulations, Spanish spirits not only suffered expulsion from Cuba, 
but were also blocked by Cuban sweet rum in Spain, leading to furious com-
plaints from the Catalan distillery lobby with which the government had to 
deal (Graph 1). In April 1892, Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas set an im-
port duty for Cuban rum at 20 cents a litre, increased to 50 % if  it was com-
mercially bottled.
Cuban rum production was in a deep recession while its competitors pros-
pered in the Caribbean. The French government announced a policy for rum 
produced in its West Indies colonies that was much more permissive than 
Spain’s despite pressure from Bordeaux wine merchants.41 Jamaican rum, es-
pecially The Old Nick Rum, by Edwards & Co., known as Negrita and distrib-
uted in Spain from 1887 onwards, reached other European markets.42 To make 
things worse, thanks to the emigration of  Cuban producers fleeing tax pres-
sure, a competitor emerged: the Dominican Republic. Andrés Brugal Mon-
taner, also born in Sitges, settled there in 1888.43 
The intensification of  competition and tariff  changes led to the disinte-
gration of  the armour that social capital had provided as in the early stages 
of  the sector’s development. Bacardí (according to the testimony of  Cuban 
liberator José Martí) had to declare bankruptcy in 1892 (Graph 2).44 In 1894, 
amidst difficult circumstances, the statutes for a new company were drawn up, 
in which Emilio Bacardí’s brother-in-law, Enrique Schueg Chassin, was in-
volved.45  Despite this, the Barcardís feared for the future of the sector. In fact, 
the family used the substantial profits derived from rum production in 1894 
in an ambitious investment: an iron mine with its own port in nearby Daiqui-
ri, the first of  many businesses undertaken in addition to the distillery.46
The outbreak of a new war of independence in 1895 made matters worse. 
Initially, rum makers (above all Bacardí) profited from sales to the Spanish 
army, despite Emilio’s having been deported for the second time to Spain and 
the new manager, Enrique Schueg, being exiled to Jamaica. The Ejército de 
Liberación [The Cuban Liberation Army] ordered production to be brought 
to a halt in order to put a stop to supply, thus leading some industries to move to 
the Dominican Republic.47  Cuba ended up having an almost marginal share 
in Caribbean production because of  the conflict (Table 3).
41. Malon (2006).
42. OEPM, marca 1808.
43. Chez Cheo (1988), pp. 197-222. 
44. Bonera (2000), p. 91.
45. Hurtado (1982), pp.  60-61. 
46. AHN, Ultramar, 211/23.
47. Chez Cheo (1988), pp. 222.
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TABLE 3 ▪ Main global rum exporters, 1890-99 
(triennial mobile average in litres)
Colony Country Exports
Martinique France 17,160
Guyana United Kingdom 15,990
Jamaica United Kingdom 10,591
Cuba Spain 4,162
Mauritius France 3,240
Guadalupe France 2,887
Reunión (*) France 1,651
Trinidad United Kingdom 540
Guyana (*) Netherlands 528
Saint Croix(*) Denmark 365
St. Lucia United Kingdom 258
(*): Exports in 1899.
Source: Pirault (1903), p. 1; Estadística(s) del Comercio Exterior (Madrid, 1890-99).
GRAPH 2 ▪ Bacardi & co.  profits (1891-1918) (in thousands of current pesos)
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Source:  Hurtado (1982), pp. 60-61.
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Rum, occupation and war, 1899-1918
After the war, the Cuban distilling industry was left literally devastated 
and with its trade ties with Spain broken. Thus, a large number of  Havana 
firms went bankrupt.48 The crisis also reached Santiago as a result of  Camp 
Hermanos’ bankruptcy, which was the hardest hit.49 The rest (Table 2) bare-
ly continued in operation and many factories suffered serious damage during 
the war. In practice, the production of  rum in the years of  the first American 
occupation was limited and discontinuous.
Producers’ expectations improved with the signing of the Reciprocity Trea-
ty with the United States in 1902, which granted a 25 % reduction in taxes on 
the importation of Cuban rum to that country. It seemed as though the doors 
to the much longed-for United States’ market — which had been closed for 
decades as a reprisal to customs duties suffered by American flour in Cuba — 
had finally opened. 
However, an increase in fiscal pressure hindered the immediate beginning 
of  this trade. In addition to the detested “impuesto de consumo” (an indirect 
tax on sales), in 1903 there was a tax of  20 cents per bottle of  rum produced 
in the country in order to guarantee the repayment of  the loan contracted 
with the United States to pay for the war veterans’ assets, taxes that the Amer-
ican authorities demanded be paid in gold.50 Furthermore, the compulsory 
requirement on the orders of  Major Davis that rum be analysed by the Lab-
oratorio Municipal de La Habana [The Havana Municipal Chemistry Labo-
ratory] prior to its exportation to the United States, was an added obstacle.51 
Checks to prevent smuggling increased during the second United States in-
tervention (1906-09). Even Emilio Bacardí himself  in the senate defended his 
stance opposing this American interference. 
Therefore, independence did not have the expected positive impact on the 
sector but quite the opposite. Producers lost the support of  the old metropo-
lis. The activity of  those institutions based on social capital, such as the 
Chambers of  Commerce, languished until 1927 and the prospects for access-
ing the American market did not materialize.
Inevitably, it was essential to design new strategic policies, contractual re-
lationships, asset choices and ways of  taking advantage of  the social capital. 
The first to notice this necessity was Barcardí. It modernized its old distillery, 
convinced of  the enormous potential of  the American market.
48. OCPI, legajo 3/6.
49. OCPI, legajo 3/2.
50. Bonera (2000),  p. 116; AHPSC, Cámara de Comercio, legajo 9/6.
51. OCPI,  41/15.
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However, technical innovation was not enough to allow it to compete 
there. Rum producers needed a more vigorous institution to deal with the new 
scenario. The Asociación de Licoreros de la Isla de Cuba [Association of  Li-
quor Producers of  the Island of  Cuba], united in a company presided over by 
Aldabó, were especially belligerent.52 It was a group of  rum manufacturing 
companies that intended to act as a lobby against US authorities. Again the 
sector used the guarantees offered by social capital since the members of  this 
institution were, for the most part, like Aldabó himself, from Catalonia. Many 
of  them were even related to one another.
In fact, the sector was unable to entirely shake off the consequences of 1898 
until the end of occupation in 1909. Only then did exports regain momentum 
(Graph 3).53 The United States’ occupation helped spread rum among the 
troops in that country.54 With the arrival of  Coca Cola on the island, a cock-
tail known as “Cuba Libre” became increasingly popular, followed by “Mo-
jito” and “Daiquiri”, which soon spread across the United States. These 
drinks were cocktails that combined young rum with tropical juices and were 
designed by the companies themselves, especially by Bacardí. Thanks to these 
drinks they created new market segments. The young rum (amber) was no 
longer a liquor for black people but the ingredient of  sophisticated cocktails 
that were consumed even by women. 
Rum was now regarded, thank to these cocktails, as a sophisticated and 
sweet drink for the upper classes and not a vulgar liquor for sailors. As strange 
as it may seem, Bacardí earned recognition as a sporting tonic there. Through 
an effective marketing campaign the firm managed to instil the habit among 
baseball players of  drinking rum before each pitch, which gave it enormous 
popularity among supporters of  the sport.55 Furthermore, Bacardí returned 
to the Spanish market with the opening of  a bottling plant in Barcelona in 
1910. It even became known in France, due to the destruction of  factories 
in Martinique during the Mount Pelée volcanic eruption in 1902.56
Cuban rum producers responded to this growing demand by strengthen-
ing social capital in the traditional rum-producing enclaves, by vertical inte-
gration and technical change. 
Networks were rebuilt after a momentary break due to emigration first 
and then this decline between 1898 and 1906. Sicars’ and Castillo’s arrival 
from Sitges consolidated the core-production in Santiago de Cuba, a city that 
became a haven for Catalan liquor-makers in crisis. There they found the 
comfort and support needed. The structures of  social capital became more 
52. Unión  de Fabricantes de la Isla de Cuba (1909).
53. OCPI, 60/13.
54. Blocker, Fahey and Tyrell (2003), p. 527.
55. Diario de La Marina, Número Extraordinario, Havana, 1918.
56. Huetz de Lemps (1997), pp. 213-218.
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sophisticated in their institutional aspects with regional groupings becoming 
authentic Catalan business schools.57
Secondly, in this new environment the old contracts lost their usefulness. 
The large scale production of  rum that was needed to supply the American 
and European markets demanded new contracts and specific assets. The two 
major producers, Bacardí and Arechabalas, set out to create a large corpora-
tion.58 Bacardí considerably improved its facilities, whereas Arechabalaba 
went even further, beginning to exploit its own sugar refinery, something no 
other Caribbean producer had done before then. Producers in Havana opted 
for product diversification. Gradually, with emancipation from Spain, de-
pendence on liquor supply in that country dwindled in such a way that rum 
makers in Havana hastened the production of  grape liqueur, following a Ca-
narian and Galician style, as well as cognac, gin and all sorts of  spirits. In or-
der to manage this, they organised an efficient trade that brought down pro-
duction costs. Return shipments from Barcelona brought cork to be used as 
bottle stoppers, while exports to New York were repaid in whisky, the distri-
bution of  which went largely unregulated in Cuba.59 In the capital, the sector 
demonstrated its extraordinary flexibility as compared to the governing hier-
archy in Santiago. Producers signed alliances with each other to jointly oper-
ate under one brand name and distillery agreements among various groups 
that lasted for a number of months. They integrated vertically and shared bot-
57. Cimadevilla (1921), pp. 51-52.
58. Chandler (1962) and (1977); Chandler and Deams (1980), p. 11.
59. Diario de La Marina, Número extraordinario, Havana, 1918.
GRAPH 3 ▪ Rum exports from Cuba and Puerto Rico (1909-1957) 
(triennial mobile average in litres)
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tle manufacturing, packaging and labelling. Trespalacios, Trueba, Aldabo and 
Gomez did so repeatedly.
The outbreak of  the First World War gave a boost to rum production. An 
increase in exports and price reflected the happy years experienced by the sec-
tor (Graphs 2 to 4). Members of  the United States army entered into combat, 
strengthened by Cuban rum, which was used as a healing liquor. It was not 
an easy business for Cuban producers due to the political conflicts caused by 
the 1917 elections (once again, Cuba was occupied by the United States army 
which extremely hindered economic activity).
Moreover, the deterioration of  the social atmosphere (together with the 
profits of  war) also made it advisable for these emerging large corporations 
to internationalize, a move that was facilitated by the links that tied the is-
land’s liquor-makers to great American entrepreneurs, most of  all those that 
had Cuban roots, such as Rionda.60 The aim of those links was not only to 
strengthen their presence in the United States, but also to finance their growth 
since the large Cuban rum companies had maintained their family nature un-
til then. Site-specific assets had lost their financial efficiency and loans be-
tween members of  the trading colony in Santiago and Cárdenas no longer 
sufficed, an area where no foreign banks operated and no stock exchange had 
been set up.
60. Coase (1937); Santamaría (1989).
GRAPH 4 ▪ Rum prices in Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1909-1957 
(in dollars per litre)
Source: Anuario(s) Azucarero(s) (1909-58); Anuario Estadístico (1957). 
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In 1918, Bacardí opened a second bottling plant on the outskirts of  New 
York, assigned to the Bacardí Corporation of  America, run by D. S. de Jong 
on Wall Street, and with John E. Tench among its shareholders. The increase 
in the volume of assets experienced by Bacardí between 1912 (182,282 pesos) 
and 1919 (3,705,024), both in current terms, serves as quantitative proof of 
this strength.61 Arechabala began sugar and rum extraction in alliance with 
the Hershey Corporation. The former sought to take advantage of  the latter’s 
trade networks, while with the agreement the American company increased 
its sugar supply. Furthermore, the United States Cuban Industrial Alcohol 
and Refining Co. set up a large alcohol refining plant, the first of  its kind 
funded by foreign capital, in Santa Cruz del Norte, on the outskirts of  Ha-
vana.62 
Under this perspective, things were easier in Havana. The greatest busi-
ness transformation as a result of  the First World War was the grouping to-
gether of  the Havana distilleries, which reduced the number of  factories in 
the whole country (Table 2). The idea of creating a large alliance had been in the 
works since 1913, on Aldabó’s initiative, who was the one who was most wor-
ried among the Havana rum makers.63 However, it did not materialize until 
1917 when the Compañía Destiladora Cubana was set up, initially with 15 
shareholders and quoted on the Havana stock exchange. The success was such 
that, at the end of  1918, it included 28 producers with factories, laboratories 
and warehouses, along with the sizeable sum of 1,700,000 pesos in invested 
capital. The company was joined by the Cárdenas shipping firm Echevarría 
& Co., so the maritime transport of  rum was also integrated.  Never before 
had a business operation of  such magnitude been carried out in Cuba nor in 
the Latin American distilling industry.64 There was 100% vertical integration 
of  the company and product diversification was also very high. This strategy 
was very useful because of  the transaction costs incurred by the social and 
political conflicts which were lived with greater intensity in Havana, in con-
trast to Santiago where, thanks to Bacardí’s control, they were much lighter.65 
The community of  interest and the need to keep up with the rhythm set by 
Bacardí and Arechabala made  this union possible. It was mostly an inter-
twined social capital, family ties, the farming community, daily contact with 
Spanish institutions and this cooperative tradition that paved the way towards 
the union which would not have been feasible otherwise.
61. Alegre (1986), p. 192.
62. OCPI, 61/10.
63. Bonera (2000), p. 144.
64. ANC, Protocolos, escrituras de Rafael Octavio Saladrigas, 1917.
65. Bonera (2000), pp.134-144.
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Prohibition and Cuban Rum, 1919-1929
At the end of  the war, Cuban producers faced an even more dramatic sit-
uation than that ailing other foodstuffs manufacturers due to the effects of 
the “Prohibition”, a law passed by the United States congress in 1919 (Graph 
4). Bacardí immediately closed its subsidiary in New York to avoid conflict 
with the police in Queens.66
The situation worsened in October 1920 after the outbreak of  the great-
est financial crisis suffered by Cuba since independence, due to the fall in the 
price of  sugar (as well as that of  rum), which hindered the repayment of 
bonds emitted by sugar-producing companies. The government prohibited 
the withdrawal of  bank deposits and, in October, cancelled stock exchange 
activity, where weeks before the value of  Compañía Destiladora Cubana had 
collapsed (Graph 5). Rum producers suffered tremendous difficulties in ac-
cessing short-term credit to finance their investments and raw material acqui-
sition.67
The two big firms also had to face a succession problem in leading the 
company in the midst of  such adverse circumstances. In 1921 José Arechaba-
66. New-York Tribune, 20, June, 1920, 7.
67. Diario de La Marina, Número extraordinario, Havana, 1918.
GRAPH 5 ▪ Value of compañía destiladora cubana shares on the Havana Stock 
Exchange, 1918-1939 (in pesos)
Source: ANC, Bolsa de La Habana, Actas de Cotización.  
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la died and a year later so did Emilio Bacardí. The former, after a succession 
of  family tragedies, was led by Tomás Pita. Pepín Bosch on the other hand, 
Schueg’s brother-in-law, took control at Bacardí. Both Barcardí and Aldama 
chose to trust management to people who were relatively far from the core 
family unit. Both made  the transition from patriarchal to professionalized 
management, leaving a well-defined internal hierarchy in decision making.68
The other Cuban companies made a series of  less drastic decisions when 
faced with change. The first of  such strategies was that of  horizontal integra-
tion. The Compañía Destiladora Cubana consolidated its control in Havana 
after taking over the Compañía Destiladora de Cuba in 1927, a company 
which had been set up by a group of  producers in 1922 when they fruitlessly 
tried to compete with Compañía Destiladora Cubana.69 Similar firms were 
created in Manzanillo, Camagüey and Guantanamo. In 1926, Bacardí went 
into partnership with a firm from Camagüey under the name Rifa y Bacardí; 
this joint-venture was short-lived, however. 
Recovery was also achieved through diversification. Bacardí, on its afore-
mentioned sites, began to manufacture bottles. In 1926 it acquired the Hat-
uey brewery, which had operated as the United States Santiago Brewing Co. 
(Graph 6) since 1914. Bacardí invested large sums in its brewery which in a 
short period of  time began to compete with the two large Havana firms: La 
Nueva Fábrica de Hielo and La Compañía Cervecera Internacional. With this 
investment Bacardí incorporated distribution networks created by the former 
American owner and increased the company’s income.
 Events in Havana prompted the rum producers in Santiago to mod-
ernize, which turned them into joint-stock companies, a type of structure that 
was far from the eastern merchant culture they had until then. Bacardí once 
more set the example in 1921.70 Castillo followed a few weeks later with Al-
buerne doing so in 1932.71
 Rum producers also responded to such challenges (low prices and ex-
clusion from the United States’ market) through technological change. Bac-
ardí set up an almost brand new factory in 1920 which was extended in 1922 
and again in 1926-28, expansion work that created an industrial complex to 
a scale never before seen in Cuba and which consolidated Santiago’s position 
as the rum capital of  Cuba (Table 4).72
These strategies were reinforced with an aggressive marketing policy that 
even made Bacardí uneasy. Their attempt to change their distinctive logo into 
68. Chandler (1977).
69. Only one company of  a particular size remained at the margin of  this corporation, 
Isidro Jaureguizar y Goyena, which in 1925 absorbed Hormaza & Co. (OCPI, 59/5).
70. OCPI,  3/17.
71. José Albuerne was established in Santiago in 1917 (OCPI, 59/3).
72. AHPSC, Fondo Bacardí, Planero.
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a modern triangular design (United States marketing consultants thought the 
emblem of the bat was too sinister) became a fiasco and the publication of  a 
million promotional pamphlets in 1927 was a complete waste of  money.73 
Other producers, acting not quite as rashly, had better results.
Integration, technological change and marketing supported the interna-
tional expansion of  Cuban rum producers, forced to seek out new markets 
following the loss of  that of  the United States. Alternatives were to be found 
in Europe. In fact, Castillo registered its brand name in Belgium in 1917.74 
Bacardí was the company that made the biggest effort internationally, to such 
a point that it became the first real Latin American multinational company. 
In 1920 it created a bottling plant in France and its liquors managed to com-
73. AHPSC, Cámara de Comercio, 9/8.
74. OCPI, l59/17.
TABLE 4 ▪ Distribution of vat from factory industry in Santiago de Cuba in 1930  
(in percentages)
Activity Establishments Vat
FOOD, DRINKS AND TOBACCO 77 66.3
Cigarette and tobacco factories 49 13.3
Rum factories 4 29.9
Beer factories 1 0.9
Vinegar factories 1 3.7
Biscuit factories 2 3.7
Chocolate factories 3 2.1
Sweet factories 3 2.6
Processed meat factories 4 2.1
Coffee factories 2 0.5
Mineral water and ice 8 7.5
Leather and footwear 13 2.7
Metallurgy 12 6.6
Wood 1 2.3
Ceramic and glass 18 9.1
Chemicals 10 8.5
Textiles 1 0.5
Paper and graphic art 14 4.1
TOTAL 146 100
Source: AHPSC, Hacienda, Matrícula Industrial.
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pete with Martinique’s, a significant milestone for the company. Eventually, 
it was able to penetrate markets in Eastern Europe, places never previously 
explored by Caribbean rum companies.75
However, it was the domestic market that sustained the Cuban rum indus-
try. In 1925 Bacardí exported only 8.7% of its production.76 The birth of  the 
tourist market with those escaping the Prohibition stimulated the industry 
through unlimited rum consumption in the already extremely famous Havana 
bars, thus mitigating in part the negative effects of  the drop in exports and 
smuggling from Barbados (in which Al Capone himself  was involved).77 Rum 
flowed at bars, hotels and brothels in Havana, then the most dissolute city in 
the Americas.78 The price of  rum multiplied in the second half  of  the 1920s 
(Graph 4). The share value of  the Havana producers’ trusts also improved 
considerably (Graph 5).
A total of  65 companies profited from this transformation of  Cuba into 
a sad and poisonous paradise. Bacardí, whose production in 1927 represent-
ed 29.6% of  the national total, was unrivalled, due to its prestige and com-
petitive edge which gave it a productivity ratio that was 25.2% greater than 
average. Its factory, with 251 workers, along with that of  the Compañía Li-
corera Cubana, with 131, were the only ones worthy of  such a name (Are-
chabala did not produce rum at that time). The rest (a third of  which be-
longed to modest Spanish immigrants), with 15 employees on average and 
a capital of  69,516 pesos (43 times less than that of  Bacardí) were no more 
than mere domestic distilleries sustained by the demand of  visiting tour-
ists.79 Bacardí wanted to show its control with the building of  new head-
quarters in 1928 in Havana, a building that was iconic of  Cuban modern-
ism and which was designed by E. Rodríguez Castells and R. Fernández 
Ruanes.  
The great depression and Cuban Rum companies (1929-1938)
In spite of  the low level of  stock market capitalisation of  Cuban rum pro-
ducers, the 1929 crisis had tragic effects on the sector. Immediately after the 
New York Stock Exchange crash, the Cuban Industrial Alcohol and Refining 
Co. collapsed, gripped by increased levels of  debt. The drop in price and ex-
75. OCPI, registro 54.838.
76. HMM, Comisión de Reformas Económicas, Cuadros Estadísticos de las fábricas de 
cervezas y licores y su producción en 1926.
77. Curtis (2007), pp. 163-166.
78. Touchard (1990), p. 255; Smith (2005), pp. 178-179.
79. HMM, Comisión de Reformas Económicas, Cuadros Estadísticos de las fábricas de 
cervezas y licores y su producción en 1926.
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ports, attributable to intensifying competition after the opening that same 
year of  a large distillery in Santo Domingo by the Spaniard Juan Barceló, left 
large firms in a complicated situation despite the safeguard offered by family 
fortunes. The increase in fiscal pressure with the announcement in 1931 of the 
Ley de Emergencia Económica [Economic Emergency Law] made the situa-
tion worse. 
Despite the crisis Bacardí consolidated its leading position (in 1930 it pro-
duced 38.8% of rum on the island) but had to close its bottle factory. The rest 
of  its plants were miraculously able to remain active by doing away with pa-
ternalistic labour relations implemented by founders (the firm was a pioneer 
in the introduction of the 8-hour working day), thus reducing operating costs. 
Small producers in Havana sought refuge in the Compañía Destiladora Cu-
bana, which in 1934 already supported over a hundred industrialists, which 
is why the size of  the plant in capital exceeded the national average (Table 5). 
With their agreement they put an end to the price war in which they were in-
volved but other producers were not as lucky and had to bring production to 
a standstill.
It was in such circumstances that the sector gladly welcomed the news of 
the end of  the Prohibition in 1932, which, along with the approval of  a new 
trade treaty with the United States, allowed exports to recommence at an ab-
normally high price (Graphs 3 and 4). However, expectations of  privileged 
access to the United States’ market soon came to nothing, this time due to 
competition from Puerto Rico, whose producers had enjoyed generous cus-
toms advantages since 1917. Essentially, the Jones Act, passed that year, 
awarded the same treatment to rum produced in Puerto Rico as that manu-
factured in the United States. Furthermore, Washington would have to return 
TABLE 5 ▪ Geographical structure of the Cuban Rum Industry in 1930 
(in percentages and thousands of litres)
Province Companies Production % of Total
Average 
Production 
Pinar del Río 3 138.6 2.2 46.2
Havana 19 2236.8 35.5 117.7
Matanzas 4 253.3 4.0 63.3
Santa Clara 11 491.9 7.8 44.7
Camagüey 7 463.8 7.4 66.3
Oriente (with Bacardí) 12 583.0 9.2 48.6
Oriente (without Bacardí) 13 2719.4 43.1 209.2
TOTAL 57 6303.8 100.0 110.6
Source: Maspons (1932), pp. 132-133.
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tax on imported rum to the Puerto Rican government. This, in turn, would 
have to be used, among other purposes, in advertising and in the improvement 
of  technical conditions in the production of  rum.80
For Puerto Rican distilleries, which had not have enough time to benefit 
from those concessions due to the passing of  the Prohibition Law in 1919, an 
opportunity had now arisen.81 The Puerto Rico Distilling Company, set up 
in 1911 in Arecibo and dedicated since then to alcohol production, along with 
Sebastián Serralles, overtook Cuban companies in the American market 
(Graph 3).82 As on previous occasions, Cuban producers were able to respond 
to this changed environment but this could not now be sustained on social 
capital due to the oligopolizing of  the sector and a major conflict of  interest, 
but had to be done through vertical integration.
Competition encouraged technological innovation in the Cuban distillery 
industry. In the case of Arechabala, when the founder’s nephew José Fermín 
Iturroz Llaguno had taken control of the company and following the destruc-
tion of facilities during the 1933 hurricane he immediately ordered the resump-
tion of rum production, as well as the construction of a new distillery capable 
of producing four million litres annually as well as a honey plant.83 The com-
pany underwent a thorough image overhaul. From 1934 onwards it used the 
new distinct commercial name Havana Club, which gave the firm an extraor-
dinary push. Soon afterwards it opened a branch in New York and the com-
pany also continued its vertical integration and diversification policies. In 
March 1932, it began to manufacture fuel marketed under the Mofuco brand. 
In 1936, Iturroz signed an agreement with the American company Charms to 
establish a large sweet factory in Cárdenas, which employed 1,024 people. In 
addition, it set up jute, paper, bottle, electricity and petrol refinery plants.
Meanwhile, Bacardí opted for relocation as a strategy. The idea had been 
developing within the family since the passing of  the Jones Act in 1917. In 
fact, throughout the 1920s it acquired land to cultivate sugar cane in Puerto 
Rico. With the Prohibition lifted, in 1937 it set up an enormous factory in San 
Juan, the island’s capital, in order to benefit from Puerto Rico’s tax advan-
tages. From this point onwards Cuban exports fell (Graph 3). 
At the time, Bacardí was already the largest and most renowned compa-
ny in the United States with a share of  two thirds of  the market.84 However, 
its investments had strengthened Puerto Rican rum production at the cost of 
Cuba’s, which was now deprived of  the company’s tutelage where it had guid-
ed the industry’s steps for decades. This decision was a heavy blow for the Cu-
80. Maguire and Teefy (2009); Smith (2005), pp. 228-229.
81. Touchard (1990), p. 183.
82.  Bureo (2000), p. 15; Gelabert  (1992).
83. José Arechabala S.A. (1953).
84. See the figures given by the firm magazine. 
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ban Treasury, insomuch as income only as taxation on liquor and tobacco 
production averaged half  a million pesos, 25 % of total tax income. The com-
pany distanced itself  from the political power in Havana that it had previous-
ly sought out. Bacardí no longer had its eyes firmly fixed on Cuba alone. 
The creation of the Duopoly: Bacardí and Havana Club (1939-1958)
With the beginning of  the Second World War, the Cuban rum industry 
experienced the advantageous effects of  an armed conflict for business. Once 
more, Cuba supplied a large share of  the rum consumed by the United States’ 
troops (Graph 3). Demand reached such magnitude that Arechabala had to 
make shipments on motorboats and even created its own shipyard to load 
them.85 The American navy made use of  them.
Moreover, in setting quotas (as was the case with sugar), the United States 
government set quite moderate prices, much lower than those paid for Puer-
to Rican rum (Graph 3 and 4), despite their sales surpassing that of  Cuba. 
Bacardi had acquired such prestige that, despite its higher price, it kept Puer-
to Rican production at acceptable levels. On the other hand, the Puerto Ri-
can government took advantage of  funds it received from the US govern-
ment by virtue of  the 1917 Jones Act (which went from US $ 22 million in 
1939 to US $ 150 million in 1945) to organise an experimental pilot plant di-
rected by Cuban Rafael Arroyo, with the goal of  sharing technical develop-
ments from Cuba.86 On the other hand, in 1942 Florida Cane Production Inc. 
signed a joint venture with Ronrico, created in 1935. The explosion of  the ex-
tremely powerful Canadian firm Seagram Co., producer of  Captain Morgan, 
onto the market complicated matters even more for Cuban distilleries, except 
for Bacardí, which played its hand at several cards.87 However, the company 
suffered the destruction of its plants in Spain and France during the Civil War 
and German occupation respectively. 
After the signing of  the Armistice, exports fell (Graph 3). Cuba lost 
ground in the United States in favour of  Puerto Rican rum. Not only was 
their product much more competitive (Graph 4), but the United States’ au-
thorities imposed exceptionally rigorous sanitary conditions on rum imports 
which Puerto Rican producers were able to satisfy through investment paid 
for by tax returns under the application of  the Jones Act. The same could not 
be said for the Cubans.88
85. José Arechabala S.A. (1953).
86. Chez Cheo (1988), p. 124.
87. Da Silva Lopes (2007).
88. Chez Cheo (1988), p. 124.
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Bacardí, guaranteed its market share in the United States due to the op-
eration of  its plant in Puerto Rico, became less worried about rum produc-
tion in Cuba in order to strengthen its brewery division. In 1946, it signed an 
agreement with the Mexican company Modelo, also founded by Spaniards, 
for the joint operation of  a large factory on the “La Candita” estate in El 
Cotorro (Havana), in addition to a second one in Santa Clara assigned to the 
affiliate company Cervecera del Mencas. The common origin of both produc-
ers, in other words their social capital, made this feasible. The company 
(whose organic structure is outlined in Graph 6) also had interests in grain 
mills, passenger transit and hospitality in Santiago de Cuba.89 These invest-
ments did not provide large sums of  money but guaranteed Bacardí’s control 
of  the Santiago district. The firm needed to be present at all the local social 
and economic initiatives to maintain its leadership in the production of  rum.
Arechabala’s expenditure, coordinated in Cuba, was even more ambitious. 
In 1946 it built a shipping terminal for its own use.90 The city of  Cárdenas was 
transformed into an industrial port complex with only one owner, previously 
unheard of  in the urban and economic history of  Latin America (Graph 7). 
That is, Arechabala, facing intensified competition in the Caribbean, opted 
for a strategy not used until then: investing in specific physical assets, distri-
bution infrastructure, based on the Williamson’s (1983) interpretation.
Gradually Havana Club was able to make a name for itself  in the United 
States and Europe through the improvement of  the ageing plant in Cárde-
nas.91 However, above all, it achieved this through stressing its position as the 
“authentic Cuban rum” with a new advertising strategy, as opposed to Bac-
ardí, which was able to boast its corporate strength but no longer claim the 
89. Jiménez (2004), pp. 527-8.
90. José Arechabala S.A. (1953); Jiménez (2006), pp. 27-28.
91. See its magazine Gordejuela. 
GRAPH 6 ▪ The Bacardí Group in 1950
 
Source: Hurtado (1982), pp.  60-61.
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same authenticity. The Cuban government, of  course, supported this strate-
gy for economic reasons. 
The growth of  Bacardí and Arechabala was a real storm that smaller Cu-
ban companies in Havana could not resist. They lacked the prestige among 
tourists and the economies of  range of  both firms. Their response consisted 
in joining large trade corporations such as Compañía Andaluza de Licores, 
Compañía Industrial y Comercial de La Habana and Compañía Importado-
ra de Vino in the capital of  the country and Palau and Albuerne in Santiago 
in 1946. They did business by importing Spanish wines that had a good name 
among Havana high society and foreigners visiting Cuba. This was the only 
gap in the market that Barcardí and Arechabala had left untouched. Strange-
ly enough, the group was set up by producers from the same geographical re-
gions, especially Andalusia and Catalonia. During those difficult times, small 
producers sought the benefits of  social capital that the large corporations had 
by then fled from.
The boom in tourism during dictator Fulgencio Batista’s term of office 
(1952-1959) and the transformation of  Havana into a haven for wealthy busi-
nessmen, the mafia, celebrities and intellectuals, such as Hemingway, who 
universalised the excellence of  the Cuban “mojito”, compensated in part for 
the deterioration of  the United States market, despite a moderation in its 
price (Graphs 3 and 4).
 The Cuban alcohol dream was short-lived. Improvements in fiscal 
concessions enjoyed by the rum industry in Puerto Rico in 1954 and the im-
plementation of  such policies by the American government in the Virgin Is-
lands (bought from Denmark in 1917) completely changed the status quo of 
GRAPH 7 ▪ Lines of business for José Arechabala, S.A.  in 1953
 
Source: José Arechabala S.A. (1953)
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rum markets. Not only did spirit traders in Saint Croix become able to export 
liquor to the United States from an advantageous position, but these policies 
also resulted in the eventual relocation of  the great Caribbean spirit firms. 
Such was the case of  the Seagram Company which moved to Puerto Rico 
after setting up a partnership with Destilerías Serrallés (Bacardí had declined 
the offer), and with Brugal on the Virgin Islands. Venezuelan rum, especially 
Santa Teresa, also snatched a share of  the market in the United States from 
Santiago and Havana.92 Cuban rum distillers were only able to maintain min-
imum export levels by making an effort to reduce prices (Graphs 3 and 4), 
which ended up being a disastrous strategy. Things looked quite different for 
Bacardí, well set up in Puerto Rico. 
The company continued with its international expansion and in 1957 
Pepin Bosch commissioned architect Mies Van Der Rohe to design a new 
plant in Tultitlán (Mexico). The company also planned the building of  prem-
ises in Brazil. By then, Bacardí had representative offices in at least fifteen 
countries in three continents.93 In the United States, where Bacardi was al-
ready a best-selling rum, its subsidiary company Castleton Beverage Co. was 
in charge of  its distribution, thus paying tax as a United States firm and not 
as a foreign one.94 
Relations between the Cuban government and Bacardí deteriorated even 
more due to the continuation of  policies that weakened traditional rum pro-
ducers, while Arechabala rubbed its hands together in anticipation. The Bac-
ardí company transferred its legal address to the Bahamas in 1957 and used 
fiscal pressure and its conflicts with the government as an excuse.
Rum and revolution (1959-1965)
We can therefore see that the Cuban rum industry’s position on the eve of 
the 1959 Revolution was hinged on two large family-run companies which 
originated in the Spanish migration of  the ninteenth century: Barcardí and 
Arechabala (Havana Club). 
Both these firms were nationalised by Fidel Castro’s government, along 
with a number of  large sugar-producing companies, on 30 September 1960. 
By then, Bacardi’s shares in Cuba were valued at 84 million dollars, the equiv-
alent of  about 56% of the Republic’s average tax revenue.95 The Junta Central 
de Planificación [Central Planning Board] extended these policies to the rest 
92. Rodríguez (2003), pp. 96-120.
93. Jiménez (2004), pp.  527-528.
94. Huetz de Lemps (1997),  p. 169.
95. Ibídem.
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of the large rum companies on 8 August 1961, coinciding with the now fa-
mous speech at Punta del Este (Uruguay) by Che Guevara. 
The Cuban state continued the production and distribution of  rum pro-
cessed at the seized companies. These were managed by revolutionary com-
mittees, who used the original trademarks, including Bacardí. Parallel to this, 
the family produced Bacardí rum at its offshore factories, arguing that the 
brand had been registered in the Bahamas, an operation which Pepín Bosch 
had been meticulously and stealthily working on for years.96 This is how two 
different rums bearing the Bacardí brand, one made in Cuba and the other 
overseas, ended up sharing the same market, until the International Court at 
The Hague ruled in favour of  the family-run company in 1964.97 By that time 
Bacardí boasted a 67.8% share of  the US rum market.98
The Cuban government responded by reorganising the entire rum indus-
try, which now had to face the challenge of  competing against vodka coming 
in from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. After completing the nation-
alisation process on 1 July 1965, the government reduced the number of  firms 
then in existence down to half  a dozen of  the best-known names. At the same 
time, Castro shut down the smallest factories in order to centre production at 
the Santa Cruz plant where Havana Club was distilled. 
Conclusion
The emergence of  a powerful rum industry is one of  the greatest achieve-
ments in Cuba’s industrial and business history and in that of the larger South 
American continent. The birth and consolidation of  the sector in Cuba was 
a consequence of  the resilience of  the island’s distilleries, which had to face, 
firstly, all the policies imposed by the central government in the capital, and 
secondly, from 1898 onward, those imposed by the United States. In the case 
of  the latter, these impositions took the shape of prohibitions or tariff  restric-
tions. 
A study of  the rum industry, therefore, offers us insight into the industri-
al achievements of  the indigenous bourgeoisie. In the Cuban business world, 
not all was centred on sugar and not everything was funded by foreign capi-
tal. Rum production was almost exclusively led by Cuban firms which man-
aged to become some of the most competitive in the Caribbean.
Great Cuban companies were born under such adverse circumstances due 
to the advantages that social capital had given them, strengthened by the 
96. Gjelten (2006), pp. 288-96.
97. Huetz de Lemps (1997), p. 169.
98. Chez Cheo (1998), p. 124.
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bonds of  common citizenship, especially Catalonian, on which the develop-
ment of  the rum industry was built, not only in Cuba but also in Puerto Rico 
and in the Dominican Republic. The rum producers of  Spanish origin wove 
institutional safety nets into the sector, guided by their own values  and hier-
archies, sharing technical expertise, management and integration agreements 
which were signed when necessary. This social capital offered strength to the 
core rum companies which were organized as authentic Marshallian indus-
trial districts and run by three great patriarchs: Bacardí in Santiago, Arecha-
bala in Cárdenas and Aldabó in Havana.
Vertical integration helped reduce transaction costs substantially, costs 
which were so high in a country that, from 1868 to 1959, had suffered two co-
lonial wars, permanent and violent political conflicts, two occupations by the 
United States, the 1933, 1953 and 1959 revolutions and several coup attempts. 
This chaos thus forced the businessmen to create big rum corporations that 
could supply everything from sugar to the ships on which the rum was trans-
ported to the United States. As a growth strategy Cuban rum companies opt-
ed for economies of  range rather than of  scale, up to the point that the large 
corporations operated with dozens of  brands.
 Furthermore, rum companies joined together in large corporations in 
order to limit falling prices in deflationary situations. Social capital facilitat-
ed the signing of  such agreements. In sum, the Cuban producers responded 
quickly and flexibly to changes in the economic situation, either through ver-
tical or horizontal integration, thanks to those non-economic links that ex-
isted among them.
Indeed, one cannot understand the agility and with which the head offic-
es of  companies made decisions and signed contracts in such a hostile envi-
ronment — not to say violent — and in an economy that was weighed down 
by institutional obstacles, which had existed both before and after the 1898 
war, without the facilities that the social capital generated by the Spanish mi-
norities provided. It was on these that site, physical, human and special asset 
specificities were built, along with their social spaces, vocational schools, em-
ployer representative bodies, lobbies and infrastructure, all built to serve 
everyone. A consideration of  this social capital, solidarity, trust and unwrit-
ten rules within foreign minorities is thus required to understand the birth of 
great indigenous companies in Latin America, which cannot otherwise be un-
derstood by exclusively using the conception of the company as a “black box” 
(Coase, 1937). Neither are all of  Chandler’s (1990) categorizations applicable 
here. The capital space in which these companies were born in Cuba was very 
small and they were set up in just a few localities amid rigid and outdated 
forms of  economic organization, consisting of  a small core of  industrialists 
who were more familiar with the market and its mechanics in their country 
of  origin but who could reach agreements and sign contracts thanks to the 
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mutual trust they had in one another and not due to any legal certainty that 
would have been guaranteed under a liberal order unknown to them, as was 
the case in the United States and the United Kingdom. As a result, and al-
though it may seem contradictory, the creation of large Cuban rum enterpris-
es responds exactly to Chandler’s theses when he linked them to American 
liquor corporations, both in size and in strategy;99 it was social capital that 
made it possible.
It should be emphasized that these rum firms became the first Latin Amer-
ican multinational companies. The relationships of  the rum elites to Ameri-
can and Spanish businessmen (yet another variant of  social capital) facilitat-
ed this internationalization. The relocation of  the headquarters of  some of 
these firms (especially Bacardí) was not the result of  obstacles encountered 
in Cuba — not much larger than those faced in Puerto Rico, Mexico or Spain. 
The change in location factors (which even affected the Canadian businesses) 
was due to a positive discrimination in tariff  terms which was enjoyed by rum 
from Puerto Rico in the United States. But above all, the international expan-
sion was the result of  ambition, of  a desire to expand markets and increase 
profits, not the happy consequence of  the birth of  these companies in a back-
ward colonial economy.
  These firms became detached from the family core in management as 
soon as succession problems emerged (the third generation). Hierarchical and 
professional management was chosen, which became so effective that the 
owners, who had settled in Spain or Miami, became completely disconnected 
from the management of  the companies. 
However, the Cuban rum companies did not entirely lose the weight rep-
resented by the family, not even Bacardí and Havana Club. The fact that nei-
ther of  these two were quoted on the Stock Exchange and that they declined 
forming alliances with other business groups, whether Cuban or foreign (e.g. 
Bacardí and Seagram) when the opportunity was available, is evidence of  the 
weight of bloodlines in the growth of these companies. This factor was shared 
by all large Cuban businesses and it can explain the loss of  control of  strate-
gic business sectors against companies from the United States. 
Social capital, vertical and horizontal integration and product differenti-
ation protected and strengthened Cuban rum companies only for a while. Fol-
lowing the end of  the Prohibition in 1932, the reduction in transaction costs 
as part of  the strategy of  large Cuban firms and the prestige of  their spirits 
were not enough to compete in the US market against rum from Puerto Rico 
and Barbados, which benefited from generous tariff  concessions. The sub-
stantial foreign investment in Cuba attracted by firms such as Havana Club 
proved useless (at least as far as the American consumers were concerned). 
99. Chandler (1962) and (1977); Chandler and Deams (1980).
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There seemed to be no alternative other than moving offshore, a strategy 
adopted by Bacardí and which led to the bulk of  its investments in Puerto 
Rico. Thus, on the eve of  the outbreak of  the Revolution most of  the rum 
known as authentic Cuban rum was not actually produced in Cuba. This is 
still true today.
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Rum, Business and Society in Cuba, 1832-1965
aBstRact
This article maintains the hypothesis that Cuba was able to become one of  the world’s big-
gest rum producers thanks to the external economics provided by its social capital. In fact, Cu-
ban rum producers had to face Spanish commercial tariffs first, and then those of  the US. It 
was only thanks to the social and economic networks built by Catalonian producers in the in-
dustrial districts that they created that rum firms could reduce their costs and become compet-
itive. Additionally, both commercial restrictions and high internal transaction costs pushed 
these firms toward greater horizontal and vertical integration. As a result of  this process, in 
1959 Havana Club and Bacardí were two of the most powerful beverage firms in the world. 
This study tries to identify the founders, origin, organization and strategies of  great non-sug-
ar Cuban companies which are not very well known in historiography.
keywoRds: Rum, Cuban business, social capital, entrepreneurship
Jel codes : N 16, N26, N66, N86.
■
Ron, negocios y sociedad en Cuba, 1832-1965
Resumen
En este trabajo sostengo la hipótesis de que Cuba pudo convertirse en uno de los grandes 
países productores de ron a escala mundial gracias a las economías externas generadas por el 
capital social. En efecto, los roneros cubanos tuvieron que hacer frente a las trabas arancela-
rias de España, primero, y de Estados Unidos después. Solo gracias a las redes económicas y 
sociales tejidas por los productores catalanes en los distritos industriales que formaron, las em-
presas productoras de ron redujeron sus costes y ganaron en competitividad. Por otra parte, 
tanto las restricciones arancelarias como los elevados costes de transacción internos llevaron 
a estas a la integración vertical y horizontal. Como resultado de este proceso, Havana Club y 
Bacardí eran en 1959 dos de las firmas licoreras más poderosas del mundo. Este texto trata de 
identificar a los fundadores, los orígenes, la organización y la estrategia de las grandes empre-
sas cubanas no azucareras, no del todo bien conocidas por la historiografía.
palaBRas clave: ron, negocios cubanos, capital social, empresarialidad
códiGos Jel: N16, N26, N66, N86
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